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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK RIGGLE and 
GENEVA H. RIGGLE, 
his wife, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
vs. Case No. 
DAINES MANUFACTURING 11629 
COMPANY, a partnership, 
D. R. DAINES, R. M. DAINES 
and J. NORMAN DAINES, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiffs sued on a promissory note and in de-
fense, the Defendants pleaded usury. (R 1-2, 27, 28). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a judg-
ment for the Plaintiffs against the Appellants and 
Defendants DAINES MANUFACTURING COM-
P ANY, a partnership, D. R. DAINES, and J. NOR-
MAN DAINES, appeal. (R 46-49) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment in 
their favor, as a matter of law. (R 56) 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 8, 1954, Defendants borrowed $10, 
000.00, payable in five years, with interest at the , 
rate of 6 % per annum. Simultaneously with the loan, ' 
Defendants entered into a written agreement, which 
has been lost or destroyed, with the Plaintiffs to em-
ploy Frank Riggle for a period of five years at the 
rate of $150.00 a month, a total of $9,000.00, which 
was an additional consideration for the loan, a re-
quired inducement for its making. (Exhibit P-3, R 
75, Exhibit D-7, R 114-115, 121, 77, 79-81, 94-95) 
A few months later, on January 18, 1955, the 
Defendants organized a corporation, merged their 
business therein, and the corporation assumed the 
obligations of the note and employment contract and 
made payments on both. '!'hereafter, on July 1st, 
1955, the corporation, as the substituted employer, 
entered into another written contract on the same 
terms and conditions as the contract with the part-
nership, for the remaining four years of the five-
year period. (R 105, Exhibit D-7, Exhibit P-2, R 73, 
Exhibit D-4, R 82, Exhibits P-5 and P-6, R 97) 
Prior to incorporation, the Defendants paid 
$450.00 on the note (Exhibit P-2, R 73) and $600.00 
on the employment contract (Exhibit P-4 and P-5, 
R 97), and after incorporation, the corporation paid 
$1,731.78 on the note (Exhibit P-2, R 73) and $3,· 
350.00 on the contract (Exhibit P-4 and P-5, R 97). 
The Defendant Partnership and the successor 
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corporation was in business at Logan, manufactur-
ing and selling store display appliances, to-wit dis-
play racks for bolted and rolled fabric materials, and 
the Plaintiff, Frank Riggle, approximately 60 years 
old, was engaged in the business of sharpening saws 
under the name of "Overnight Saw Service" at Og-
den, Utah, (R 105, 66) which required all of his time, 
six days a week. (R 100-101) 
The Defendants were in serious financial cir-
cumstances, were under-financed and limited to 
short-term loans, and they were unable to borrow 
money with which to pay their current obligations, 
which at that time, were approximately $10,000.00. 
These facts were well-known by the Respondent Rig-
gle. Mr. Riggle had these facts verified by his ne-
phew, an accountant. (R 106, 116, 67, 68, 69, 75-76) 
The Defendants approached Riggle initially 
with the proposition of purchasing stock in the cor-
poration to be formed, which Mr. Riggles considered 
and declined. ( R 109) 
Mr. Riggle demanded a bonus for the making of 
the loan, a doubling of his money, and various meth-
ods were discussed, involving 5 % of the gross profits, 
a sweeping out of the Defendants' place of business 
occasionally at Logan, Utah. However, they finally 
agreed to a five-year consultation agreement, as 
mentioned, to accomplish this purpose. (R 76, 77, 
78-79, 110-112, 121) 
All parties felt that the Defendants were on the 
3 
verge of prosperity because of favorable negotiations 
with J. C. Penney Co. for an approved listing of their 
product. (R 116-119) 
Mr. Riggle had been advised by his accountant 
nephew that the Defendants had a high potential for 
success. (R 69) 
The ground was fertile for a usurious contract. 
The inducement for such a contract was not one-sided 
but was mutual. With the employment contract Mr. 
Riggle would double his $10,000.00 in five years 
(Exhibit P-3, R 73). With the pressing creditors out 
of the way and the J.C. Penney listing accomplished, 
the partnership believed it would be a thriving and 
profitable business. 
Plaintiff Riggle did not have $10,000.00 avail-
able; only $3,500.00, and he had to borrow $6,500.00 
from his bank to complete the transaction. (R 70) 
Riggle sharpened Defendants' saws they used 
in their business, for which he was separately paid. 
(R 84) 
The employment agreement was for a five-year 
term. Mr. Riggle was to receive $150.00 per month, 
and he was required to make himself available for 
consultation during business hours at his office in 
Ogden and at the Defendants' office in Logan. The , 
agreement provided that he would be paid an addi-
tional $50.00 per day for any time that exceeded , 
three days in any month. (Exhibit D-7) 
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Mr. Riggle had no talent or business experience 
that would be of any value to the Defendants. He 
knew nothing whatsoever about their business. His 
business experience, while varied, was very limited. 
He was not an Engineer, and his College training was 
limited to a few weeks' course in forestry. (R 64-66, 
85-87) 
Although the Plaintiffs assert the employment 
agreement was entered into in the month of August, 
1954, subsequent to the note, they agree that Riggle, 
before being placed on the Defendants' pay roll as of 
September 1, 1954, worked two or three months for 
nothing (R 94-95) and that Defendants agreed, dur-
ing the negotiations for the loan, to employ Riggle 
as an inducement for its making. ( R 79-81) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE WAS NOT VOID BE-
CAUSE OF USURY AS THE EVIDENCE 
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
THE TRANSACTION WAS USURIOUS 
The Note was executed and delivered on July 8, 
1954, and is governed by the law then in effect, which 
made usurious contracts void. 15 - 1- 6 U.C.A. 1953 
with foot notes. Also see 44 - 0 - 6 U.C.A. 1943. 15 -
1- 6 U.C.A. 1953 Annotated, with foot notes, reads: 
"All bonds, bills, notes, assurances, con-
veyances stock, pledges, mortgages and deeds 
of trust, and all other contracts and securities 
whatsoever, and all deposits of goods or other 
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things whatsoever, whereon or whereby there 
shall be reserved or taken or secured, or agreed 
to be reserved or taken or secured, any greater 
sum or greater value for a loan or forbearance 
of any money, goods or things in action that 
as above prescribed shall be void. Section 44-
0-6, U.C.A., 1943" 
"Repeal. This Section (L. 1907, Ch. 46, 
Sec. 5; C.L. 1907, Sec. 1241 x3; C.L. 1917, Sec. 
3324; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-6) relating to 
the voiding of usurious contracts and securi-
ties, was repealed by laws 1955 Ch. 21, Sec. 2." 
We recognize the Court will not reverse the Trial 
Court's findings and judgment if there is substantial 
evidence to support them, and that positive testimony 
of witnesses believed by the Trial Court is ordinarily 
regarded as sufficient to compel affirmance of Trial 
Court's findings, but it is not necessarily so under all 
circumstances. If the evidence in the light of atten-
dant circumstances and countervailing testimony, 
and if, when so viewed, it appears so clearly and 
palpably unreasonable that no fact trier acting fairly 
and reasonably could accept it, then it must be reject-
ed as a matter of law, and in fact determined other-
wise by the appellant court. This is particularly so 
where the testimony in question was that of witnesses 
who had vital personal interest in the controversy. 
Seybold vs. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 121 Utah 61, 
239 Pac. 2d 17 4; Continental Bank and Trust Co. vs. 
Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 Pac. 2d 890; 9 Wigmore 
Evidence, 3rd ed., Sec. 2494. 
In Continental Bank and Trust Co. vs. Stewart, 
6 
supra, in an Opinion written by Chief Justice Croc-
kett, the Court reversed the findings of the Trial 
Court, and in doing so said : 
"While it is true that the tstimony of a 
witness such as Mr. Cheney would ordinarily 
be regarded as sufficient to compel the affirm-
ance of the trial court's finding, that is not 
necessarily so under all circumstances. Def en-
d ant is correct in arguing that even though the 
testimony standing alone might be sufficient 
to support a finding, it must always be ap-
praised in the light of all the attendant circum-
stances and countervailing testimony. If when 
so viewed, it appears so clearly and palpably 
unreasonable that no fact trier acting fairly 
and reasonably could accept it, then it must be 
rejected as a matter of law, and the fact deter-
mined otherwise. This is particularly so here 
where Mr. Cheney had such a vital personal 
interest in the controversy, since it obviously 
would be greatly to his advantage if he could 
fix upon Mr. Stewart the responsibility of pay-
ing this large unsecured personal debt." 
The evidence, in the light of attendant circum-
stances, reasonably and clearly established as a mat-
ter of law that the employment contract was an in-
ducement for the $10,000.00 loan and rendered the 
loan usurious and void, irrespective of whether the 
employment agreement was entered into at the time 
of the execution and delivery of the Note or a few 
weeks later, as Riggle testified that the employment 
contract, which extended over a five-year period at 
the rate of $150.00 per month, was entered into pur-
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suant to the Defendants' promise to do so in consid· 
eration of his making the loan. This is undisputed. 
CR 79-81) 
The rule is that, where an agreement is finally 
consummated subsequent to the making of the loan 
to give usury, such, nevertheless, renders the loan 
usurious, where made pursuant to a promise made 
prior to or at the time of the making of the loan. 
Grann'is vs. Stevens, 111 N.E. 263 (N.Y.); Conr 
nor Airlines Inc. vs. Aviation Credit Corporation, 
280 F. 2d, 895 (5th Cir.) 
In Grann'is vs. Stevens, supra, the Court held 
that an employment contract entered into as an in-
ducement for a loan a week or ten days subsequent to 
the making of the loan and pursuant to a promise 
eleven months prior to the loan was usurious. The 
Court said: 
"There was evidence that the loan was 
usurious. About eleven months before it was 
made and during plaintiff's suspension from 
the Stock Exchange, a memorandum in writ-
ing was delivered between the plaintiff and 
the brother of the defendants, which provided, 
inter alia, that if plaintiff was not reinstated 
in the Stock Exchange within the two months 
next following, he would sell his membership 
"and lend the proceeds thereof to Mr. Stevens, 
to be employed in his stock exchange business 
on terms to be later agreed upon, which will 
return Mr. Grannis not less than $10,000 a 
year." The moneys loaned were avails of the 
sale there provided for. The note was "with in-
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terest at 6 per cent per annum." About a week 
or ten days after the loan was made, the bro-
ther and the plaintiff entered into an agree-
ment in writing which provided that the plain-
tiff should be employed by the former and be 
paid $533 each month. Such sum was "to make 
up the balance" of $10,000 per annum, unpaid 
by the interest at 6 per centum per annum 
upon the amount of business he brought in. 
The plaintiff did not render any substantial 
service as an employee to the brother or his 
firm. The brother testifield, without contra-
diction, that he agreed to pay the plaintiff 
$10,000 a year for the use of his money in the 
firm, for the $60,000 he had in as capital; that 
plaintiff was supposed to draw at the rate of 
$933.33 each month, or $10,000 a year, and 
that the agreement to pay him $533 a month 
grew out of his having loaned the money. The 
plaintiff was paid for a period of six or seven 
months following upon the loan, pursuant to 
the agreements. Those facts permitted the trial 
court to decide that when the note was given, 
the agreement between the borrower and lend-
er was that there should be taken for the loan 
of the money interest at a rate exceeding $6 
upon $100 for one year, and that the note was 
therefore void. General Business Law (Con-
sol. Laws, c.20) paragraphs 370-373. A trans-
action of the character of the agreement of em-
ployment between the brother and the plaintiff 
may be a mere device or subterfuge to conceal 
usury and be assailed as and found to be such. 
If the court can see that the real transaction 
was the loan or forbearance of money at usur-
ious interest, its plain and imperative duty is 
to so declare and hold the security void ... " 
(Emphasis added). 
9 
And in Connor Airlines Inc. vs. Aviation Credit 
Corporation, supra, a financing agreement which 
was not usurious when made was held to have been 
rendered usurious by its extension in conjunction 
with the subsequent amendment of a contemporan-
eous contract with a person other than the lender, 
which was intended as a device to evade the usury 
statute. The extension agreement was pursuant to the 
provisions in the original contract and entered into 
approximately three months subsequent. The Court 
said: 
"Where there is an intent on the part of a 
lender to make a loan or to extend a maturity 
for a greater profit than is permitted by law, 
the transaction is stained with usury even 
though it is cast in a form which was designed 
to give it a cloak of apparent legality. Courts 
do not permit the use of design or device to 
evade the purpose of the usury laws. Griffin 
vs. Kelly, Fla., 92 So. 2d 515; Beacham vs. 
Carr, 122 Fla. 736; 166 So. 456. The amount 
of a bonus exacted in connection with financ-
ing will be regarded as interest in determining 
whethe1· the usury law has been violated, and 
this is true whether the bonus inures to the 
benefit of the lender, the agent of the lender, 
or to the benefit of another. Speler vs. Monnah 
Park Block Co., Fla., 84 So. 2d 697; Stouta-
mire vs. North Florida Loan Association, 152 
Fla. 321, 11 So. 2d 570; Richter Jewelry Co. 
vs. Schweinert, 125 Fla. 199, 169 So. 760; Hop-
kins vs. Otto, 118 Fla. 865, 160 So. 203. The 
fact that Smith Aircraft and Aviation Credit 
are separate corporate entities does not pre-
vent the financing bonus from being treated 
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as a usurious exaction in view of the relation-
ship, through L.B. Smith, of the two compan-
ies." 
In taking into consideration that Riggle admits 
that he was placed on the payroll on September 1, 
1954, and that prior thereto he worked for two or 
three months for nothing and the subsequent written 
agreement of July 1, 1955, with the corporation for 
four years, such is in line with the Defendants' testi-
mony that, at the time of the execution of the note, 
there was a written agreement for five years. It was 
not a mere coincidence that the employment contract 
and the payment of the note ran for the same period 
- five years. Riggle testified: 
"A. Along with the rest of the contract, you 
understand. We didn't have a contract 
agreement between this contract was 
drawn. 
Q. You talked? 
A. That is right. I worked for them two or 
three months for nothing .... " (R 94-95) 
We urge that it is unbelievable that Riggle, a 
60-year-old man, would have parted with $10,000, 
$6,500 of which he had to borrow, without the bonus 
arrangement being reduced to writing and would 
have placed himself at the mercy of anyone in serious 
financial difficulty. He would not have left the $9,000 
bonus to chance. ( R 70). 
However, as we pointed out, it makes no differ-
ence when the employment contract was entered into, 
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as it was agreed, prior to the making of the loan and 
as an inducement for the making of the loan, that 
such an agreement would be entered into. 
An obligation, once usurious, is always usurious 
as long as its original existence continues and the 
transaction is not cured although a third party is 
substituted for and continues to pay the usury. The 
Court so held in the companion case of Riggles vs. 
Daines Manufacturing Co. 20 Utah 2d, 391, 438 Pac. 
2d. 808, also see Asperita vs. California Trust Com-
pany, 322 Pac. 2d 265; W estrnan vs. Dye, (Calif.) 4 
Pac. 2d 134; Richardson vs. Foster, 170 Pac. 321 
(Wash.); Fidelity Security Corporation vs. Vrug-
man, 1 Pac. 2d 131. 
Riggle knew that the Defendants were having 
serious financial problems, were up to their ears in 
debt, were desperate for money and unable to borrow 
money with which to pay their current obligations 
(R 67, 75-76) and this situation he took advantage 
of. In this regard he testified: 
"Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Well, they did tell you all this time, they 
were in trouble with their debts? I think 
you said that. 
That is right. That is right. 
As a matter of fact I think you said they 
were in debt up to their ears? 
That is right. That was what Rendell told 
me. He said, "We are in up to here ( indi-
cating). We are sunk." 
They also said they were having trouble 
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getting money to pay their debts, didn't 
they? 
A. Well, I don't know as that was discussed. 
I assumed that, of course, but I don't 
know as I asked them any such question, 
if that came up. I supposed they wouldn't 
have been in if it hadn't been a dire neces-
sity. I just assumed, I don't know." (R 
75-76) 
Riggles recognized that, because of the Defen-
dants' dire need for money, this presented them with 
a "dream of a chance". He testified: 
"A. That potential wasn't mentioned at that 
time at all. I mean that it wasn't discuss-
ed, you understand. We had worked that 
out, and that was between my nephew and 
Richard Potts and I about the potential, 
and I figured this, there was three young 
men with an exclusive feature. I just fig-
ured it was a dream of a chance." ( R 78) 
There is no question that the purported employ-
ment of Riggle for an approximate five-year period 
at the rate of $150.00 a month or a total of $9,000.00 
was an inducement for the making of the $10,000.00 
loan, a bonus to him. Riggle testified: 
"Q. 
A. 
As a matter of fact it was agreed that 
you would - if you loaned them the $10,-
000.00 that they would put you on the pay-
roll, wasn't it? 
Eventually, yes. Not at a set time or when, 
nothing. It was futuristic, you under-
stand. This was a general discussion and 
nothing definite was determined at that 
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time and they didn't put me on the payroll 
at that time. 
Q. And they told you or said that the way t:-0 
put this something additional to paying 
you the $10,000.00 would be to put you 
on the payroll, would be the way to handle 
it? 
A. It wasn't nothing at all. He said that 
would be what it probably was. 
Q. The way to pay you more than $10,000.00 
was to put you on the payroll? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
More than what? 
More than the 6 per cent interest. I mean, 
what you were to get on the payroll would 
not be credited on the note? 
That is right. 
Q. That would be an additional-
That is right. A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So in order to get you more there than 
your $10,000.00 at 6 per cent you would 
be put on the payroll to make it more than 
that, and you would get $150.00? 
That is right. 
It was a separate deal as, if and when, and 
they agreed at that time, that the note was 
signed, that you would be put on the pay-
roll, didn't they? 
Eventually yes. 
But at that time they said, "We will put 
you on the payroll?" 
A. Yes, that is right. 
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Q. And they did put you on the payroll? 
A. That is right. Not at that time, however. 
They didn't put me on the payroll at that 
time." (R 79-80) 
and in this respect, Riggle further testified: 
"Q. What it finally ended up in you were sup-
posed to get $150.00 per month? 
A. That is right. 
Q. From the payroll, and not to be credited 
on the note? 
A. That is right. 
Q. This has been discussed prior to lending 
the money, and it was discussed at the 
time the note was signed? 
A. Before, during and after; yes, sir." (R 
81) 
At the time of the loan, Riggle was engaged in 
the business of "sharpening saws" at Ogden, which 
required his entire attention, for, as his wife testified 
on direct examination, because of their business they 
could only go to Logan on Sundays. She said: 
"Q. All right. Now, did you take any trips to 
Logan? 
A. Well, I say. Yes. Of course, we were free 
only on Sundays. 
Q. Did you take many Sundays up to Logan? 
A. Yes." (R 100-101) 
Mr. Riggle, the saw sharpener, except as such, 
never performed any service for the Defandants, nor 
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was it intended he should, and while his contract of 
employment provided that he was to give advice in 
in business and in metal engineering, neither his ex-
perience nor training qualified him as a business or 
metal engineering consultant. Riggle's business ex-
perience, while varied, was very limited. He was not 
an Engineer, metal or other wise, nor did Defen-
dants' business require one. His college training was 
limited to a short course in forestry. He knew abso-
lutely nothing about Defendants' business. Yet, ac-
cording to the employment agreement, Defendants 
agreed to pay him $150.00 a month for five years, for 
consultant advice 45 miles away at Ogden, with the 
provision of an additional $50.00 a day for each day 
spent in Logan in excess of three days a month when 
his services were required there. ('R 64-66, 85-87, 
Exhibit D-7). 
In this respect, in part Riggle testified : 
ness, he said : 
"Q. And other than your enterprise, as your 
mining interest, have you ever been in any 
other kind of business? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No. 
Have you operated a business? 
No. Employment is all, that is right. 
Other than your saw. Well, let me ask you 
this. On the mining, were you on a salary 
or were you-
N o, I was working for myself. When I 
worked in the Lake Shore Mine, I worked 
16 
on a salary, of course. I was sharpening 
steel and doing blacksmith work. 
Q. And you did some prospecting work too, I 
believe? 
A. Yes, I prospected a great deal. (R 85) 
An again, as to his limited business experience 
and that he knew nothing of the Defendants' busi-
ness: 
"Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
And other than that, that was your busi-
ness experience in the business world. 
Outside of that you - and your saws, you 
have been on salary all your life? 
That is right. 
Now, did you know anything about the 
manufacure of display equipment? 
Nothing at all, other than seeing the pro-
ducts and having seen them in the plant 
up there. 
Did you ever have any experience selling 
anything like this? 
No. 
You didn't have any experience with the 
Daines people in selling for them, did you? 
No, sir. (R 86-87) 
Actually, the Plaintiffs and Defendants merely 
maintained a social relationship. They visited back 
and forth with each other occasionally, had dinner 
and went boating together. (R 115) 
It is inconceivable, except for the purpose of pro-
viding the Plaintiff with a bonus for the loan, and to 
evade the usury laws, at Plaintiff's request, that De-
17 
fendants would obligate themselves in such amounts, 
for a five-year period, for such non-professional ser-
vices, especially when they could get qualified profes-
sional advice from personnel at Utah State Univer-
sity and others, on a problem basis and without obli-
gating themselves on a long-term, five-year contract. 
When Riggle was pressed, on cross-examination, 
he could relate only three instances where he gave so-
called advice on matters of so-called importance, 
namely ( 1) about the lawn mower business, a busi-
ness in which he was engaged, and then for the pur-
pose of his sharpening lawn mowers for them; ( 2) 
the marine business, a business foreign to him and in 
which he had no experience; and ( 3) he complained 
about the Defendant's $3,000 office, which turned 
out to be an area of about 15 feet by 15 feet partition-
ed from the manufacturing area because of noise. (R 
91-92, 93, 98, 125) 
That Plaintiff's and Defendants' employment 
agreement, mutually arrived at, was a sham and a 
device to evade the usury laws is apparent from a 
mere cursory reading of Riggle's testimony, and 
establishes this as a matter of law. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. The evidence by clear and convincing proof, 
without contradiction, established that the $10,000.00 
loan was conditioned by the Plaintiff receiving a 
bonus of $9,000.00. To effect this purpose a spurious 
employment contract for the purpose of evading the 
usury laws of this State was entered into, which ren-
dered the transaction usurious and void. 
2. In the light of Riggle's testimony that he 
worked two or three months for nothing before he re-
ceived his first salary payment on September 15, 
1954, there is no question that the employment agree-
ment was entered into at the time of the making of 
the note. 
3. That Riggle did not perform any service, nor 
was it intended he do so, and that the employment 
agreement of $9,000.00 was a bonus for the making 
of the loan of $10,000.00 and a device to evade the 
usury laws, and the Note is void. 
4. That whether or not the contract of employ-
ment was entered into on July 8, 1954, or in the month 
of August the same year, or by a subsequent written 
agreement on July 1, 1955, the loan was nevertheless 
usurious, and this is so whether the Court considers 
the employment was for a four- or five-year period, 
for the employment contract was a bonus and an in-
ducement for the loan, no matter when entered into. 
We urge that the evidence in this case, even when 
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limited to the testimony of the Plaintiffs Riggle, 
establishes as a matter of law that the transaction 
was usurious and that this Court should reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and direct it to enter 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and J udg-
ment in favor of the Appellants. 
Respect£ ully submitted, 
RICHARD J. O'ROURKE, 
L. DELOS DAINES, 
Attorneys for AppeUants 
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